Tag Archives: eighth_amendment

The Effect of the USSC Decisions on State Criminal Justice Systems

Its not often that we know what the fall-out is after a Supreme Court decisions tells the states that some of its criminal justice practices are no longer permissible.  Yet, the Tampa Tribune did exactly that on September 2, 2012.[1]  In Courts grappling with juveniles’ life sentences[2], we hear from county prosecutors and public defenders on the fall out from both Miller v. Alabama No. 10-9646 (2012) and Graham v. Florida No. 08-7412 (2010).  Both of these cases dealt with juvenile sentencing and the eighth amendment.  First, in Graham, the Court invalidated sentencing juveniles to life without parole for any crime less than homicide as violating the Eighth Amendment.  Then in Miller, the Court went a step further and struck down sentencing schemes that required life without parole for juveniles convicted of homicide.  Taken together, the cases disallow the sentencing of juveniles to life.

The Court clearly seems to be on track to forcing state criminal justice systems to be more lenient toward anyone convicted before majority. [3]  And, as is usual the Court in these cases did not answer any questions that are not asked.  In each one (Roper, Graham and Miller) the Court took the most severe juvenile sentence off the menu leaving the states to grapple with the question of what is next?  What types of sentences will be judged constitutional?

According to the Tampa Tribune, judges and prosecutors are working like actuarial accountants—investigating the life expectancy and working backwards to create sentences that would be in the ‘safe zone’.  Yet, there is no consistency and sentencing is now variable and individual; “Part depends on who the judge is, who the prosecutor is, how the person has done since incarcerated…” said a Miami Dade public defender.

And the article also points out the loophole left to prosecutors—the Court disallowed automatic sentencing of life without parole.  Life without parole may still be constitutional as may long sentences of seventy-five plus years since the word ‘life’ is not mentioned.  Or, is the invalidation of life sentences for juveniles the next step for the Court and should states get ahead of the curve and simply adjust now?

The decisions of the Supreme Court do not necessarily make life easier on those that must apply them, and clearly in this case, the decisions do not help the lower courts that must now determine what sentences are still viable under the new rulings.  This article is a great resource for showing students the trickle down effects of a decision and the open-ended nature of all the questions we investigate when we study constitutional law.


[1] A hat tip goes to the Sentencing Law and Policy Blog for pointing out the article.  http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_law_and_policy/

[3] Recall in Roper v. Simmons 543 US 551 (2005) the Court ruled that capital punishment for juveniles is unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment.

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Due Process and Eye Witness Testimony

In academic circles and public interest groups, the reliability of eyewitness testimony has been under fire for some time.[1]  Psychologists have been studying the procedures used to identify suspects and the overall reliability of eyewitness accounts; the most prominent of these is Gary Wells of Iowa State University.[2]  The research indicates that individuals generally are poor observers; for example, eyewitnesses tend to be more certain about identification at trial than at initial interview.  Procedures have a large impact on the reliability of eyewitness identification—e.g. , sequential identification is more reliable than the traditional all-at-once line-up; line-ups work better when the officer in charge does not know who the suspect is.  The unreliability of this type of testimony has led several states to abolish or alter their use in cases involving the death penalty.  For example, in Maryland, the state legislature changed their penal code to require DNA evidence or video of the crime or confession before allowing prosecutors to seek the death penalty.  New Jersey and Illinois simply abolished capital punishment.

Clearly, the stakes are higher in a capital case than any other criminal prosecution.  However if eyewitness testimony, based upon psychological understanding of the process of identification, is so questionable, why is it generally discussed only in the context of capital cases?  If a procedure or method is deemed capricious or arbitrary, isn’t the due process clause triggered for all criminal defendants accused or convicted based upon eyewitness testimony?

The Supreme Court and the criminal justice system have long recognized that additional safeguards are necessary in capital cases (recall Furman v. GA 408 U.S. 238 (1972) and Gregg v. GA 428 U.S. 153 (1976)).  The Court, though, has also recognized the deprivation or the potential deprivation of liberty as triggering other fundamental rights of due process, such as the right to counsel throughout the criminal justice process (see Duncan v. LA 391 U.S. 145 (1968); Argersinger v. Hamlin 407 U.S. 25 (1972), In re Gault 387 U.S. 1 (1967), Hamilton v. AL 368 U.S. 52 (1961), US v. Tucker 404 U.S. 443 (1972), Miranda v. AZ (384 U.S. 436 (1966)), among others.)

This term the Court will consider the case of Perry v. New Hampshire (10-8974).  According to SCOTUSblog, the issue before the Court is:

“Do the due process protections against unreliable identification evidence apply to all identifications made under suggestive circumstances or only when the suggestive circumstances were orchestrated by the police?”

This issue, though, does not address the fundamental question regarding eyewitness testimony.  If this type of testimony is unreliable under the best of circumstances, if the use of eyewitness testimony can lead to arbitrary or capricious results, why are we only concerned with capital cases or cases with potential police misconduct?  The costs of loss of liberty to an innocent person are also high and false conviction can haunt an individual well after a sentence is served.  The consequences of false conviction can include possible loss of the right to vote, difficulty in obtaining employment, etc.  What level of tolerance does or should the criminal justice system have for error?  Wells found that an 18% error rate in line-up identification via computer when all suspects are shown at once; the error rate drops to 12% when the photos are shown one at a time.  If a six percent reduction in error is enough to mandate a change in state criminal justice procedures, are we comfortable with a 12% error rate in eyewitness testimony?  What does due process require of the criminal justice system now that we are aware of the deficiencies of this type of testimony?


[1] The recent controversy over the Troy Davis’ execution lead to some media coverage of this issue.

[2] The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit accepted Wells as an expert witness along with his methodology in an appeal in 2003 (319 F.3d 301).

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